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GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER,

123 S. CT. 2325 (2003)
FACTS
The University of Michigan School of Law (Law School) receives
approximately 3500 applications for 350 available seats each year.' The Law
School seeks to admit the most capable group of students for each first year
class. 2 To achieve this goal, the Law School ensures that enrollment includes
students with diverse backgrounds and experiences. 3 In 1992, the Law
School unanimously adopted an official admissions policy that reflected
these goals. The Law School had found that an applicant's undergraduate
grade point average (GPA) and Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) score
alone were unreliable predictors of success in Law School .5 To correct this
flaw, admissions officials further ranked an applicant according to all the
information contained in his or her file. 6 For the typical applicant, this
included a personal statement, letters of recommendation, and a detailed
essay on projected contribution to diversity. The Law School also
considered "soft variables" such as enthusiasm of recommenders, quality of
undergraduate institution, quality of the written essay, degree of difficulty of
undergraduate course selection, and potential contribution to the communal
and scholarly aspects of the Law School.7
To attain a diverse student body, the Law School considered these
elements in conjunction with an applicant's race. 8 The Law School sought to
ensure the enrollment of a "critical mass" of minority students, rather than a
specific number or percentage. 9 Thus, the Law School aimed to enroll an
amount of minority students sufficient to preclude the possibility of these
students feeling isolated among their non-minority peers.' 0 The Law School
also believed that inclusion of African-Americans, Hispanics, and NativeAmericans in the class would accentuate educational benefits of diversity,
such as enhanced class participation and discussion, experiences in and out
of the classroom, and a breakdown of racial stereotypes."
Subsequent to the adoption of the new admissions policy, Barbara
Grutter, a Caucasian Michigan resident, with an undergraduate GPA of 3.8
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(out of a possible 4.0) and LSAT score of 161 (out of a possible 180), applied
for admission to the Law School. 12 The Law School wait-listed and
ultimately denied Grutter's application for admission.' 3 Grutter then filed
suit against the Law School in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan,' 4 alleging that the Law School discriminated against
her on the basis of her race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981." The district
court found in Grutter's favor and the Law School appealed.' 6 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari .
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the
defendant and held that the Law School's admissions policy did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause because it was narrowly tailored to further a
compelling state interest in obtaining a diverse student body. 8
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court began its analysis with a discussion of Regents
of University of California v. Bakke,' 9 in which the Court held
unconstitutional a medical school's racial set-aside program.20 The Court
noted that although Bakke produced six separate opinions and no majority
opinion, courts have regarded Justice Powell's opinion as the holding of the
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admissions program.22 Justice Powell had stated that the state's interest in
diversity is rooted in the academic freedom inherent in the First Amendment
of the constitution and that the nation's future is greatly dependent upon
students' exposure to a diverse educational environment.23
Under Justice Powell's analysis, race or ethnicity alone could not
determine diversity.24 Thus, the Law School could attain its goal of diversity
by using race in conjunction with other characteristics to obtain a diverse
student body. 25 The Court noted that because race is a group classification,
the Courts would conduct an extremely detailed determination to ensure that
the Law School did not violate individual rights within this group.2 6 Thus,
strict scrutiny was appropriate; 27 if the Law School had narrowly tailored its
a compelling governmental interest, the
use of racial classifications to further
28
Court would uphold the policy.
The Law School argued that its strong interest in the educational
benefits of a diverse student body compelled its use of race as a factor.29 The
Law School further contended that this interest was essential to its
educational mission. 30 The Court agreed, noting that Bakke had recognized a
compelling interest in promoting diversity in the context of higher
education. 3' The Court stated that the tradition of according a degree of
academic decisions is inherent in the notion of
deference to a university's
"educational autonomy."32 As Bakke recognized, courts accord universities
deference due to both the important purpose of public education and the
promotion of freedom of speech and thought within the university
environment.33 However, such autonomy has constitutionally prescribed
limitations.34 The Court stated that a university must make a good faith
effort to confirm that diversity is central to its educational mission.35
The Law School argued that it had to enroll a "critical mass" of
minority students to further its educational mission.36 The Court responded
that racial classifications must be narrowly tailored to eliminate
unconstitutional practices based on racial prejudice or racial stereotyping that
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do not further the compelling interest in diversity." The Court explained that
quota systems are not narrowly tailored." By removing a certain category of
applicants from competition for admission, they fail to be a good faith means
of achieving diversity.39
The Court found that the means the Law School employed were
flexible. 40 The Law School considered a variety of factors for admission and
used race only as a plus factor in the context of each individualized
applicant's file. 4' The Law School did not remove an applicant from
competition for admission with the remainder of the applicant pool. 42 The
Law School thus evidenced a good faith effort in attempting to attain a
critical mass of underrepresented minorities.4 3 Therefore, 44 the Court
concluded, such a critical mass did not amount to a quota system.
The Court explained that a school's program must be flexible enough
to review each application on an individual basis.45 In programs that make
race a plus factor, individualized attention is necessary to preclude the
possibility of racial prejudice.46 The Court noted that the Law School's
program was highly individualized because it employed a holistic review that
considers a multitude of characteristics and allows a potential student to
contribute to the diversity of the student body.47
According to the Court, the Law School had never limited the list of
characteristics that promote diversity. 48 Rather, the program's flexible
approach considered a wide variety of characteristics besides race and
ethnicity, such as travel abroad, foreign language fluency, personal adversity,
community service, success in careers in other fields, unusual intellectual
achievement, employment experience, nonacademic performance, and
personal background.49 Consequently, the Law School accepted nonminorities with lower grade and score credentials while denying admission to
similarly situated minorities.50
The Court explained that schools must seek race-neutral alternatives
in their effort to obtain the educational benefits of student body diversity,
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although they need not use every available alternative. 51 Grutter argued that
the Law School had not considered neutral undergraduate "percentage plans,"
which guarantee admission to all students above a certain class rank
threshold in every high school in the state.52 The Court rejected this
argument because Grutter failed to show the plan's feasibility with regard to
graduate and professional institutions.53 The Court also noted that such a
plan might fail to provide the necessary individualized consideration by
automatically admitting certain students.54
The Court also stated that a program must not unduly harm nonmembers of the preferred racial or ethnic group.5 5 A program must try to
inflict the least harm possible to other innocent applicants competing for the
program's benefit.56 In order to prevent harm to the majority, a program
should use race only as a plus factor in the context of individualized
consideration and not bar an applicant from consideration just because he or
she is not a member of the preferred racial group. 57 Here, the Law School
considered all characteristics of diversity and often chose non-minority
applicants over underrepresented minority applicants who could have
contributed to the overall diversity of the student body. 58 By doing so, the
Law School effectively reduced the potential burden or harm to nonminorities.5 9 Thus, the Court concluded that Grutter had no valid claim of
unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 °
The Court commented that Grutter might have a basis for a claim of
unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment in the future. 61 The
Court explained that because the core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
is to do away with all governmental discrimination based solely on race, a
race-conscious policy should be temporary.62 Racial classifications are
appropriate only as long as a compelling governmental interest requires
them. 63 Noting that twenty-five years had passed since Bakke, the Court
suggested that affirmative action policies might not be appropriate in another
twenty-five years. 64
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CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer joined, began her
concurrence by analyzing the Court's suggestion that affirmative action
should have a durational limit. 65 According to Justice Ginsburg, a durational
limit may be correct in theory but inapplicable in reality.66 This is because
numerous courts continued to bar the application of affirmative action
programs and policies after Bakke due to the lack of clarity in its fragmented
decision.6 ' Justice Ginsburg also pointed out that public school statistics
showed that segregation in the school system is still a reality.68 Thus, she
cautioned, it may not be appropriate to firmly dictate the abolishment of
affirmative action within the next twenty-five years. 69
DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justice Scalia argued that the Law School's critical mass reference
was merely a plot to hide an admissions policy based on racial quotas.' 0 He
rejected the Law School's argument that it had a compelling interest in the
educational benefit of diversity, stating that Law Schools do not test students
for their ability to understand various cultures. 7 ' He further argued that the
Law School's true interest was to retain its prestigious reputation and
asserted that the majority's ambiguous holding would open the floodgates of
litigation. 2 Finally, Justice Scalia argued that the Constitution bars all
government discrimination based on race and that an interest in diversity in
education does not overcome that bar.'3
Justice Thomas asserted that African-Americans could succeed in
society without the admissions office's unconstitutional helping hand. 74 He
stated that the Constitution bars racial discrimination as well as the
majority's wide degree of deference to the Law School. 5 Justice Thomas
contended that the Law School's rigorous admissions standards excluded the
vast majority of minority applicants. 6 Therefore, he argued, the Court could
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not give deference to an institution that had only itself to blame for the need
of a race-based policy to correct such exclusion.77
Justice Thomas likened a compelling governmental interest to a
pressing public necessity.78 He cautioned that the Law School's refusal to
employ race-neutral alternatives reflected a broader interest in achieving
racial balancing. 79 This absence of race-neutral alternatives revealed the Law
School's desire to improve its education without sacrificing its elitist
reputation, and such an interest could not be a pressing public necessity. 0
Finally, Justice Thomas expressed his opinion that race-based admission
policies would be just as unconstitutional in twenty-five years as they are
now.8 ' He concluded that the academic credentials of minorities would
remain stagnant compared to those of their non-minority counterparts
because affirmative action holds minorities to lower standards.8 2 Thus,
affirmative action would fail to close the intellectual gap. 3
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the Law School's admission
policy was not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.8 4
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Law School's "critical mass"
terminology was just a term of art for quotas.85 Pointing to admission
statistics from 1995 through 2000, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the
Law School's aim to admit the exact number of minority student applicants
was the direct result of racial planning. 6 He further argued that the
Constitution did not allow the Law School to admit certain racial groups to
satisfy certain statistical representation."
CONCLUSION
The Court expressed the opinion of this country's minority
population with one exception. The Court acknowledged that not all
individuals are similarly situated within the realm of higher education.
While whites have enjoyed educational opportunities throughout the
country's history, most minorities have not enjoyed such opportunities and
are still afforded a sub-par education. Lacking sufficient political power to
correct this discrepancy, they relied on the judicial system to protect their
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concerns. The Grutter Court did not fail them. Recognizing its role as a
protector of minorities, the Court stated that the Law School had a
compelling state interest in furthering diversity in its student body.
Perhaps cognizant of the potential backlash of such a holding,
however, the Court inserted a durational limit argument at the end of the
opinion, stating that affirmative action will cease to operate within twentyfive years. This is because twenty-five years have passed since Bakke and,
according to the Court, minorities have made great educational strides during
that time. Following this logic, minorities should rise to equal footing with
non-minorities within the next twenty-five years. This unnecessary attempt
to pacify opponents of affirmative action might be fruitful if it did not
contradict the Court's opening statements, in which it acknowledged that
some courts have struck down constitutional programs since Bakke. It would
therefore be inconsistent to attribute all educational advancement of
minorities to Bakke because courts have not uniformly upheld affirmative
action programs. Thus, the Court cannot now use this artificial twenty-five
year period to claim that minorities will achieve the academic success of
non-minorities within another twenty-five years.
A simple example demonstrates why the Court's argument fails.
Instead of using Bakke as a reference point, African-Americans, and Native
Americans as well, could just as easily calculate the appropriate duration of
affirmative action by determining the number of years that they were denied
equal educational opportunities, dating back to the pre-Civil War era. It
would not be any less arbitrary to assert that affirmative action should be the
prevailing doctrine for a span equal to the amount of time that elapsed
between the first occurrence of racial atrocities in this country and Bakke.
The most logical approach would therefore be to let the natural passage of
time dictate when the affirmative action doctrine has outlived its purpose.
One could regard Grutter's holding as a necessary evil. It is
essential to afford minorities certain educational opportunities from which
they have historically been excluded until the effects of slavery and other
suppressive techniques are effaced throughout society. Inevitably, however,
the illusion of favoring one group leads to discontent in the seemingly
disfavored group. As a result, there is a wide-growing belief among nonminorities that achievements of minorities are due solely to affirmative
action. Thus, affirmative action is a double-edged sword; while its
implementation is necessary to erase the debilitating effects of slavery,
racism, and inequality, it prevents minorities from ever proving themselves
worthy of their ensuing progress.
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Magali R. Langhome

